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Civilizing the World Order? The 
Scope and Potential of Transnational 
Norm-building Networks 
Cord Jakobeit, Robert Kappel and Ulrich Mückenberger
Civil society organizations, epistemic communities, and lobby groups—what we call 
transnational norm-building networks—are infl uencing the global economy and glo-
bal politics more than ever before. We argue that such transnational norm-building net-
works, in contrast to the dominating executive intergovernmental elites and democrat-
ically defi cient supranational bodies, hold the scope and potential for a more civilized 
world order. They are—together with states and international governmental organiza-
tions—creating new norms; they are sett ing standards. They associate the voice of stake-
holders with decision-making processes, thus leading to an increase in legitimate world 
governance.
Analysis
A closer look reveals several signifi cant patt erns of global politics and economics in the 
current fi nancial and economic crisis:
Experience has shown that in times of crisis, expectations of state crisis manage-
ment are particularly high. This was the case in the period 1929–1931 and in the 
immediate post-war period; it is no diff erent in the current global economic cri-
sis. However, this reliance exclusively on the nation-state’s creative capacity and on 
inter state cooperation is misleading because as a result, the risks of the action based 
on this reliance are not adequately taken into consideration.
The development opportunities off ered by new scenarios and actor constellations—
transnational non-state actors, in particular—are not recognized.
Today’s world must be seen and evaluated as being networked. Transnational net-
works play a greatly underestimated role in the globalized world, the global econ-
omy and global politics.
Consequently, the world’s nation-states are only one type of actor among many.
Globalization and the erosion of the importance of territorial borders represent, 
on the one hand, threats to established democratic achievements, as the “bad net-
works” of transnational organized crime, among others, demonstrate. On the other 
hand, they open up space for a new, civil world order.
In this phase of increasing networking, it is essential to establish the foundations for 
the legitimacy of transnational actors and for eff ective norms. This would be a con-
tribution to the democratic civilizing of the world.
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1.  The Networked World and the Nation-state
The global financial crisis, with its various impacts 
on the OECD world, among the new regional 
powers (China, India, Russia, Brazil and South 
Africa), and on developing countries, has resulted 
in a global economic crisis. Numerous industries 
and banks are bankrupt, while several states are 
suffering from mistakes made in the past and from 
speculative attacks on their currencies. Private res-
cuers obviously only help out when the business 
pays off and when states and/or intergovernmental 
organizations subsidize downsizing and adjust-
ment. Almost all countries are enacting extensive 
rescue plans in order to secure the banks, indus-
trial enterprises, and jobs. The crisis managers are 
following in the footsteps of the Keynesian model 
of the 1920s and 1930s. At that time the British 
economist John Maynard Keynes proposed the use 
of massive economic stimulus packages, national 
credit measures (for example, for driving demand 
through the provision of jobs), and economic 
interventions to resolve the Great Depression and 
thereby avoid militarization, de-democratization 
and war (Keynes 1983). Today’s crisis appears to 
be the “hour of the executive powers” once more: 
these executive powers make us believe that they 
are able to do as they see fit. But whether it is the 
American or the German nation-state, or all cur-
rently acting governments, they are at the limits 
of their national and global scope of action and 
are burdening their successors and future gener-
ations with ever greater and almost impossible to 
overcome debt.
In recent decades the State has increasingly 
been “de-Stateified.” The government spending 
ratio has decreased, State operations have been 
privatized, and the State intervenes significantly 
less often to regulate the market. The State is also 
being increasingly “denationalized.” It has ceded 
numerous responsibilities to supranational organ-
izations such as the EU or the WTO. These organ-
izations are today taking on a more guiding role 
than ever before. The weakened nation-state is 
also the result of the new dynamics of globaliza-
tion, according to which national states, as a re-
sult of transnational linkages, are only one set of 
actors among many (Zürn and Leibfried 2005; 
Risse 2004; Beck and Grande 2007).
The actors of globalization are networking 
the world. This led American journalist Thomas 
Friedman (2006) to the following thesis: “The 
world is flat.” There is something to this—not en-
tirely new—idea. The world is becoming smaller: 
transportation, logistics and transaction costs 
have decreased; with the exception of 2009, trade 
is increasing more than national economic power; 
and economic interdependency has increased dra-
matically due to foreign direct investment. These 
worldwide interactions, according to Friedman, 
make the world flatter. Transnationally active busi-
nesses organize production, transport chains, and 
bank transactions. Numerous concrete examples 
of the “flat” globe exist: the trade in coffee and 
flowers, the auto and chip industries, the bank-
ing sector, sea transport, air traffic, and all areas 
of industrial production. Retail chains and large 
corporations dominate these so-called buyer- and 
producer-driven chains. Even smaller businesses, 
the hidden champions, are integrated in global 
value-chains. This fundamental and very rapid 
process has led to an irreversible shift in economic 
power relations and structures. Through their ac-
tivities, globally active businesses are establishing 
networks across the entire globe. These networks 
develop globally effective norms and standards—
for instance, technical and business norms and 
environmental, labor, human rights and quality 
standards (Schmitz 2004; Gereffi, Humphrey, and 
Sturgeon 2005; Kappel and Brach 2009; Bartley 
2007; Kollmann 2008).
Businesses and trade associations together 
manage their activities, enter into contracts, estab-
lish norms and agree upon long-term delivery re-
lationships. In the event of disputes, it is the busi-
nesses themselves that settle them. Businesses, 
lobby groups, transnational advocacy networks 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998), consulting firms and 
human rights, environmental and consumer 
groups engage interactively in norm building 
within value chains (Brach and Kappel 2009); act 
with an eye to the public; and, through heavy 
lobbying, directly influence economics, society 
and politics. The State is often only peripherally 
involved in such negotiation processes. It concerns 
itself mostly with the framework conditions and 
laws, but the interactions among the transnational 
actors and the formation of the relationships with-
in the value chain take place largely alongside and 
outside of State structures.
The State’s room to maneuver is also being chal-
lenged by illegal networks such as mafia groups and 
criminal networks, which have built up extensive il-
legal economic structures and which challenge, and 
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sometimes successfully defy, nation-states’ control 
(Gottschalk 2009; Saviano 2008; Adelstein 2009). 
Such transnational organized crime networks 
dominate in some parts of the world, for instance, 
southern Italy and large areas of Afghanistan. The 
retreat and weakening of states in many parts of 
the world has in recent decades opened up new 
and often difficult to control terrains and options 
for action—money laundering, the drug and dia-
mond trades, counterfeit goods, bet rigging, pros-
titution and human trafficking—for these criminal 
networks (Bakonyi and Jakobeit 2007). 
As numerous studies illustrate, the power of 
states no longer depends only on economic and 
military power, but rather on soft power, that is, 
their networking capacity vis-à-vis other states 
(Slaughter 2004 and 2009). The State is becoming a 
“network agency.” Migrant networks, universities’ 
allure, research and cultural exchanges, economic 
cooperation, and non-state networks are limiting 
the influence of states more strongly than previ-
ously assumed and are making clear how much 
global networks influence states—for instance, 
non-state development organizations; pro-fair-
trade groups; and the actions of politically active 
groups such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, 
Oxfam and Transparency International. The stand-
ardization of technical norms; the worldwide 
establishment of labor, environmental and human 
rights standards; codes of conduct for businesses, 
such as corporate social responsibility (CSR); and 
the expansion of public-private partnerships dem-
onstrate transnational networks’ increasing scope 
of political action.
2. The Threat to Democracy as a Result of 
Governmental Internationalism
The above illustrations demonstrate the extent to 
which various actors are networking and estab-
lishing norms. These new developments are, how-
ever, largely left out of the current debate. Instead 
it is claimed, particularly in parts of the global 
governance literature, that in the global world it 
is the supranational entities—such as the WTO, 
the UN or the EU—that can best steer global pro-
cesses (Commission on Global Governance 1996). 
But these inter- and supranational organizations 
are threatening democratic achievements. The 
erosion of and deficit in democratic legitimacy be-
come apparent when one observes the decision-
making levels of supra- and international organ-
izations such as the EU or the WTO. Citizens are 
excluded from effective participation; instead it is 
the nation-state and intergovernmental executive 
powers that act.
The elections to the European Parliament, 
which took place from June 4–7, 2009, have made 
clear that, despite the gradual expansion of the 
European Parliament’s participatory rights, there 
can be no talk of a parliamentarily legitimized 
European legislature. The voting decisions are de-
termined by national considerations and national 
political dynamics, not by the expectation that 
here an actual European legislature, much less 
a European constituante, is forming. The nation-
state executive bodies, together with the European 
Commission, remain the most important actors in 
European norm formation. Simultaneously, the 
European Court of Justice has made itself the most 
important, yet least democratically legitimate, 
European norm-building and norm-monitoring 
entity.
The widespread unease with the decisions out of 
Brussels is based not least on the fact that this deci-
sion-making process is neither transparent nor easy 
to follow; that is, the rights and duties that come 
“from Brussels” are at best indirectly ascribable to 
the desires and the “voice” of the citizens affected. 
This is true not only of the core area of European 
integration, economics, but also increasingly of the 
“third pillar” of integration, in the areas of justice, 
freedom and security. Attempts at and the tendency 
towards the strengthening of the executive powers, 
which are interlinked across borders, abound. The 
legal, security, finance and migration experts of the 
national executive bodies are collaborating without 
democratic controls and without the involvement 
of the new transnational actors from civil society. 
They are formulating the standards which they 
themselves then apply, monitor and sanction. The 
EU develops European supranational law, which is 
superior to the constitutions of its member states. 
It isolates itself from the people, who are not in-
cluded in its decisions. The European demos is turn-
ing away, something made clear by, among other 
things, the low and further decreased voter turn-
out for the elections to the European Parliament. 
And why should this caricature of the separation 
of powers according to the rule of law be implicitly 
legitimized through encouragement from the citi-
zens via increased voter turnout?
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The problem is even more apparent at the glo-
bal level (that of the WTO, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund). On the one hand, 
the executive powers, which are scarcely subject 
to parliamentary or civil society control, cooperate 
here as well, set standards, and make often-irre-
versible decisions. The deficient legitimacy of this 
practice could possibly be offset through good, 
quick and effective decisions. On the other hand, 
however, this latter form of decision making often 
lacks every effectiveness as well. While the current 
financial and economic crisis appears to have ne-
cessitated Europe-wide and international cooper-
ation among nation-states, this is in reality scarce-
ly taking place or, given the reconstitution of na-
tional interests, is limited to the symbolic politics 
of valorized intergovernmental institutions such 
as the G-20. The possibilities for action on the part 
of the EU in cooperation with the nation-states are 
thus restricted. If the governmental international-
ism before the crisis was oriented to the expansion 
of globalization, privatization and deregulation, 
so could it now be the case, in the aftermath of 
the shock, that national responses and rhetorics 
could again gain the upper hand. Here it is appar-
ent that illusions of options that can scarcely be 
carried out have been awakened: numerous polit-
ical fields have already been codified in a binding 
fashion as a result of the activities of international 
governmental organizations, for instance, within 
the framework of the WTO. Here also we are not 
dealing with democratically legitimized decision-
making and norm-building processes: it is trans-
governmentally linked national executive bodies 
that are operating. They are practicing a self-ref-
erential type of politics and are largely defying 
democratic controls. Regulations are determined 
beyond direct parliamentary review and legitim-
ization and largely without the inclusion of trans-
nationally active civil society actors.
A fundamental problem with such supra- and 
international decisions is that the implementation 
of the regulations and decisions formulated is 
delegated to the nation-states, within which they 
have not directly, and at best indirectly, achieved 
democratic legitimacy. The consequence is deficits 
in both legitimacy and effectiveness. Communities 
made up of approximately 200 nation-states and 
without wide-reaching supra- and international 
regulatory and enforcement entities can generally 
only make decisions according to the lowest com-
mon denominator. These decisions are not directly 
democratically legitimized, nor can they be effect-
ively implemented at the operational level of the 
international organizations. It is often left to par-
ticularly interested states and transnational civil 
society actors to improve these decisions and to 
monitor their impact. Examples of this are evident 
in the areas of arms control, human rights, and en-
vironmental policy. The 1997 Ottawa Convention 
prohibiting the use of anti-personnel mines would 
not have been realized without the high degree of 
participation by nongovernmental organizations 
and the active engagement of a group of states 
made up of, among others, Canada, Norway and 
Austria. Nongovernmental groups and peace 
groups were also important actors in the moni-
toring of the provisions of this convention. In 
human rights policies, Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch, among others, have proven 
to be drivers and supervisors of state actions. In 
international environmental politics related to the 
improvement and monitoring of existing agree-
ments on species protection, nongovernmental 
organizations such as the World Wide Fund for 
Nature or Conservation International have made 
a name for themselves. One could argue that we 
are talking here about marginal themes and pol-
icy fields; however, the examples demonstrate 
that the transgovernmentally networked national 
executive bodies cannot operate as they wish to 
everywhere.
3.  Integrating Civil Society in Norm Building 
at the Global Level
The globalization-driven norm-building and inte-
gration processes described above, within which 
the national executive bodies in many cases domin-
ate, exhibit two central problems. The citizens af-
fected no longer perceive them as being traceable 
to their desires and their voice, and they thus lack 
democratic legitimacy. Additionally, they do not 
measure up to expectations in terms of their reach 
and practical implementation, and are thus lack-
ing in practical effectiveness. These two problems 
need to be in the foreground when one wishes to 
developas we will try to do in the followingan 
alternative conception of a civilized world order 
in the age of globalization.
A few years ago there were critiques of the 
State and “Stateification” and calls for a global 
civil society and for approaches regarding a dis-
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cursive collectivization at the global level (Risse 
2006). Not only has this discussion become si-
lent, but massive opposition which supports the 
return of the state has also emerged (cf. the ver-
dict of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
on the Treaty of Lisbon). Only rarely do we hear 
the call for transnational cosmopolitanism or a 
global societal contract. Just as there can be no 
global demos, so can there also be no democratical-
ly legitimate global state. However, we are by no 
means saying that the present world order cannot 
be a democratically civilized one—even without 
a global demos and a global state. We make two 
claims to this end, one more theoretical and one 
more practical. The theoretical claim is as follows: 
a democratically civilized world order requires 
that decisions made at the global level regarding 
rights and duties need to be more strongly linked 
to the desires and voice of those affected by these 
rights and duties. The practical claim is the fol-
lowing: what is required is, first, the validation, 
encouragement, and support of civil society ac-
tors and networks that are striving at the trans-
national level for universal regulations regarding 
rights and duties and their implementation; and, 
second, the linking of such non-state norm-build-
ing networks with national and international state 
entities that are democratically legitimate (above 
all parliaments).
Given the variety and diversity of the world’s 
demoi, to speak of a global demos would be a mis-
take. One can rather speak of global civil soci-
eties—in plural, however, because they form and 
make themselves known on different topics and 
in different constellations. These global civil soci-
eties often exhibit a border-, language-, and cul-
ture-transcending character—as demonstrated by, 
among others, the networks surrounding the UN 
World Conference on Women. Based on experi-
ence to date they are often “hybrid formations,” 
consisting not only of civil persons but also of 
state representatives, parliamentarians, economic 
representatives, etc. This makes them well suited 
to building bridges in the global-“governance” 
triangle of politics, the economy and civil society 
(Mückenberger 2008a). In our opinion these glo-
bal civil societies are, so to speak, the ideal seeds 
of the democratic civilization of the world order.
 Civil society initiatives and movements 
are increasingly raising their ”voice” for world-
wide norms (Mückenberger 2008b; Hirschman 
1970). There is a multiplicity of themes and actor 
constellations: women’s rights, human rights, core 
labor norms for the employed, social and environ-
mental standards, etc. Networks of a different na-
ture strive towards regulations for fair economic 
market relationships and quality standards. Still 
others are working towards regulations for an 
economically sustainable lifestyle and way of 
working. These civil society constellations share 
the view that the classical form of international 
politics (“governance by governments”) is not 
suitable for solving global problems. They also 
see the supra- and international structure as ineffi-
cient, inadequate and even possibly autocratic. 
These civil society initiatives and movements ei-
ther take on regulatory development themselves 
and comply with self-generated norms (“gover-
nance without governments”), or they pressure 
international political and economic actors to 
develop and practically implement such regula-
tions (“governance with governments”). An ex-
ample of “governance without governments” is 
the Forest Stewardship Council, which began to 
develop the first certification system and quality 
seal for sustainable forestry at the beginning of the 
1990s. The organization’s decision-making body is 
composed of timber companies as well as social 
and environmental NGOs; the members cannot 
out-vote one another but are instead obligated to 
reach consensus-based decisions. Overall, the area 
dealing with the establishment of social and en-
vironmental standards—with organizations such 
as RugMark fighting child labor in carpet produc-
tion or the granting of quality seals (fair-trade) for 
products from developing countries—has experi-
enced a real boom in the last two decades (Bartley 
2007).
One may debate the magnitude, reach, ef-
fectiveness and weight of these civil society ac-
tors, initiatives and movements; who they repre-
sent and how, as well as the mandate according 
to which they operate, must also be scrutinized 
(Jordan and van Thuil 2007). They have to be dis-
tinguished from the “bad networks,” which pur-
sue only particular interests and use illegitimate 
methods. Within the networks described, one can 
distinguish cosmopolitan civil societies and at-
tempts at civilizing the world, both of which de-
sign cross-border norms and can exercise “voice” 
on the basis of these new norms.
As a result of transnationally active initiatives 
and movements and of civil actors and organiza-
tions, it is only an inconsistent plurality of rules 
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and regulations that has for now come into being 
in the globalizing world (Dingwerth and Pattberg 
2006). These are at times purely private in nature; 
in many cases they also constitute hybrid struc-
tures between public and private norm building. 
Often regulatory frameworks of different origin 
become connected in practical work—for instance, 
when transnational companies incorporate the 
core labor norms of international labor organiza-
tions or the human rights catalogue of the UN’s 
Global Compact in their codes of conduct (Ruggie 
2002). At times the regulatory frameworks make 
different, even contradictory, claims. Regime col-
lisions—some corporate codes of conduct do not 
conform, for example, with those advanced by 
human rights organizations—arise and require 
mediation, which more often than not leads to the 
development of competing norm and certification 
systems. Nevertheless, these transnationally ne-
gotiated norms make perceptible the texture of a 
world law and a civilizing of global politics (Risse, 
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Schuppert 2006).
These transnationally devised norms have 
at any rate not arisen only from the outcomes of 
states’ negotiations. Rather, actors exert consid-
erable influence on the concepts and ultimately 
on the agreed-upon norms at the non-state—eco-
nomic and civil society—level within the forma-
tion and enforcement processes. That the efforts of 
a world civil society contribute to the emergence 
of codes, standards, norms and international law 
makes clear the extent to which global democratic 
structures have already emerged. A newly devel-
oping connection between the raising of voice and 
the quest for rights and duties (entitlements) can 
be detected—as is characteristic of democratic 
communities but which has until now only been 
observable at the level of nation-states.
Gradually—and this is what we view as the 
opportunity of globalization—this nexus of voice 
and rights/duties also appears to be taking on a 
transnational character. Therefore, the possibil-
ity cannot be excluded that within the new global 
interplay of networks, norm building and trans-
nationality the cornerstones of a new legitimate 
and effective democratic world order will be re-
vealed. These will naturally not replace the activ-
ities of the nation-states and their international 
organizations, but will rather build upon, monitor 
and supplement them.
The current crisis shows how necessary it is not 
only to respond to the globalizing economy with 
civilizing regulations but also to channel the un-
controlled executive power of the nation-states to 
the democratically legitimizable goals of a world 
society. Additionally, “criminal networks” need to 
be pushed back and the legitimacy of international 
actors needs to be increased. We call this the “civil-
izing of world order.” The term refers to what has 
been, based on Karl Polyani (1944), labeled re- 
embedding. This means the reconnection of eco-
nomic and political power with accepted socio-
cultural norms (Granovetter 1985). In his analysis, 
which was composed under the influence of fas-
cism, Polyani concentrated on the re-embedding 
of the economy in society. Today we go further: we 
must view the transnationally active networks as 
the new designers of a civil world order, opposing 
the increasingly unbounded executive power of 
the nation-states with a new model of a democra-
tizing world order. Who other than the emerging 
cosmopolitan civil societies could be the appropri-
ate agents of such a civilizing of globalization?
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